Uudiseid mujalt

SCBA Field Day Speakers 2014

Vimeo beekeeping - 17. august 2014 - 20:37

Beekeepers gathered for the annual field day.

Cast: Mary Sobczak

Tags: beekeeping, honey. pollinator and youth in business.

UNITED KINGDOM- SYSTEMIC PESTICIDE CONCERNS EXTEND BEYOND THE BEES

Apinews - 17. august 2014 - 16:46
UNITED KINGDOM- SYSTEMIC PESTICIDE CONCERNS EXTEND BEYOND THE BEES

Paper prepared by Michael Gross

 

 

 

Summary

Systemic pesticides, including the widely used neonicotinoids, have been linked to colony losses in honeybees and declines in other pollinator species. More recently, evidence has accumulated suggesting that their widespread, often prophylactic use is harming important parts of soil and water ecosystems, putting biodiversity and ecosystem services at risk

USA- MICROSPORIDIA, HONEYBEES AND COLONY COLLAPSE DISORDER

Apinews - 17. august 2014 - 16:42
USA- MICROSPORIDIA, HONEYBEES AND COLONY COLLAPSE DISORDER

Paper prepared by Louis M. Weiss and James J. Becnel

 

 

 

Summary

From an evolutionary perspective, honeybees originate from predatory wasps that have abandoned predation to favor collection of nectar and pollen as food sources. The impact of microsporidian infections on colony fitness of Asian honeybees remains largely unknown. Nosema ceranae is currently the dominant microsporidia infection in honeybee colonies in many parts of the world, with few if any N. apis infections found. Honeybee colonies die for a number of reasons, often during winter, including starvation, ests, and pathogens. In Europe, there is only one recent observation of colony collapse disorder(CCD) symptoms reported, although European large-scale colony losses have been linked to N. ceranae infections. Microsporidian infections can be correlated to losses of honeybee colonies for both N. apis and N. ceranae. However, neither of the two parasites can be linked to CCD symptoms in the United States or in Europe.

SPAIN- ULTRA HIGH-PERFORMANCE LIQUID CHROMATOGRAPHY COUPLED WITH HIGH-RESOLUTION MASS SPECTROMETRY: A RELIABLE TOOL FOR ANALYSIS OF VETERINARIAN DRUGS IN FOOD

Apinews - 17. august 2014 - 16:36
 A RELIABLE TOOL FOR ANALYSIS OF VETERINARIAN DRUGS IN FOOD

Paper prepared by María del Mar Aguilera-Luiz, Roberto Romero-González, Patricia Plaza-Bolaños, José Luis Martínez Vidal and Antonia Garrido Frenich

 

 

 

Summary

The difficult decision regarding the presence or absence of veterinary drug (VD) residues in complex food samples, as well as the large number of residues that could be present, requires the use of high resolution mass spectrometry (HRMS). The high resolving power, mass accuracy and sensitivity offered by HRMS analyzers allow a reliable identification of analytes in complex matrices. Besides, full-scan MS approaches offer the possibility of performing a sensitive and simultaneous analysis of a theoretically unlimited number of analytes. For all these reasons, liquid chromatography (LC) coupled to HRMS analyzers is becoming an attractive alternative to traditional methods based on low resolution mass spectrometry (LRMS) analyzers. Thus, time of flight (TOF), quadrupole-time of flight (Q-TOF) and more recently, Orbitrap analyzers coupled to ultra-high performance liquid chromatography (UHPLC) have been currently used for the determination of VD residues in food samples. In these applications, it has been demonstrated that the combination of UHPLC and HRMS is a suitable tool to fulfill key requirements in terms of sample throughput, sensitivity, selectivity and analyte confirmation, even at low concentrations. This chapter describes the most relevant information and main advances related to the application of UHPLC-HRMS to the determination of VD residues in food samples.

ARGENTINA- NEW EDITION OF THE RADIO PROGRAM EL CAMPO Y USTED

Apinews - 17. august 2014 - 16:15
ARGENTINA- NEW EDITION OF THE RADIO PROGRAM EL CAMPO Y USTED

Interview to Mr Mariano Menghini,  Eduardo Riquel  and  Alejandro Malti

 

 

 

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USA- HONEY MARKET UPDATE

Apinews - 16. august 2014 - 17:15
USA- HONEY MARKET UPDATE

Prepared by S. Kamberg & Co on August 2014

 

Every The honey We are still in a situation of exhausting each world market honey crop as it enters the market. World raw honey market prices are gaining on U.S. raw honey prices. As long as demand remains strong, world raw prices will continue to rise until at some point in the future they meet U.S. honey prices. Colony Collapse Disorder is still a concern in the world honey market, but it is being managed by beekeepers. Managing this condition and rebuilding hives is costly and is adding to the cost of raw honey.

 

Specifically by region:

 

U.S.A.

The 2014 U.S. honey crop is still coming in, and although final numbers won’t be available for a while, crop projections are at around 170 to 175 million lbs. Abundant clover and good weather conditions in the upper Mid-West have combined to give us what could be the best U.S. honey crop in the last 4 years. The demand for this honey is at an all-time high, and this honey crop should sell out early at prices comparable to last years’ record high prices.

 

Canada

The 2015 Canadian honey crop should be about average, and prices should stabilize after last years’ record high prices. Prices should be comparable to U.S. raw honey prices.

 

Argentina

It is too early to project the 2015 Argentina honey crop. This honey will not be available until February or March 2015. This honey will be in high demand by U.S. and European packers. Argentina produces limited Light Amber Honey. White honey from Argentina should be comparable in price to both U.S. and Canadian White Honey.

 

Brazil

Brazil has an expanded honey crop season due to the large expanse of land. Brazil is producing more organic honey which is reducing the volume of their regular crop honey. Organic honey sells at a higher price than standard honey. Prices for standard Brazilian honey are rising and are more comparable to Argentina honey.

 

Vietnam

The 2015 Vietnam Light Amber honey crop should enter the market in March. Europe has entered the Vietnamese honey market increasing the demand for this honey. Price projections for this honey are at 10% to 20% higher than the 2014 crop.

 

India

The 2015 India honey crop should enter the market in February or March. India produces much of the Extra Light Amber Honey in the World market. India raw honey prices have risen dramatically, and 2015 crop prices are projected to be 15% to 20% higher than last year’s honey crop prices.

 

Ukraine

As world raw honey supplies are exhausted, new sources are being explored. The Ukraine produces a lot of honey, but the quality was unreliable. The U.S. is looking more to the Ukraine as a honey source, and the Ukraine is working to supply high quality honey. More Ukraine honey should enter the U.S. market next year. Prices for this honey should be comparable to India honey prices.

USA- NEW PROGRAM LAUNCHED TO BOOST HONEYBEES POPULATION

Apinews - 16. august 2014 - 17:04
USA- NEW PROGRAM LAUNCHED TO BOOST HONEYBEES POPULATION

In light of the decline of honeybee populations around the world, the Mississippi Farm Bureau Federation, in cooperation with several other agricultural organizations, has launched the Mississippi Honeybee Stewardship Program. This program outlines the basic standards that should exist between farmers and beekeepers when bees are located in or near agricultural production areas.

USA- ELEVEN YEARS OF DUTY EVASION UNDER THE ANTIDUMPING ORDER ON HONEY IMPORTS FROM CHINA

Apinews - 16. august 2014 - 16:56
USA- ELEVEN YEARS OF DUTY EVASION UNDER THE ANTIDUMPING ORDER  ON HONEY IMPORTS FROM CHINA

Article written by By Michael J. Coursey

 

 

 

The petition seeking the imposition of antidumping ("AD”) duties on honey imports from China was filed 13 years ago, in September 2000, by the American Honey Producers Association ("AHPA”) and Sioux Honey Association ("Sioux Honey”), on behalf of their members. Fifteen months later, upon the successful completion of the government’s ensuing AD investigation, the AD order on Chinese honey was issued ("Honey Order”), and remains in place today.

In the AD investigation, the U.S. Commerce Department ("Commerce”) found that Chinese honey was being dumped in the U.S. market at prices far below the cost of production in China; and the U.S. International Trade Commission ("ITC”) found that these duped imports were materially injuring domestic honey producers in the U.S. market.

Since then, Commerce has subjected the Honey Order to:

· Ten completed annual administrative reviews (each of which covers imports that arrived during the year before the review’s initiation); and

· Twenty-three "new shipper” administrative reviews (each of which covers the first imports from an exporter that did not ship to the U.S. market during the period covered by the original AD investigation).[2]

Through these proceedings, Commerce has investigated a total of 77 Chinese honey exporters, and found that each had dumped Chinese honey into our market at substantial rates. As of today, three of these exporters are operating under an AD "duty deposit rate” of between $0.45/lb. and $0.75/lb. The other 74 exporters– and all of the many exporters that have not been reviewed by the agency– are operating under a duty deposit rate of $1.19/lb., which is the current "China-wide” rate.

This means that any U.S. importer that wants to enter a container holding 40,000 pounds of Chinese honey must deposit between $18,000 and $47,000 in cash with U.S. Customs and Border Patrol ("Customs”) upon honey’s arrival. Further, for the importer to recover that "cash deposit,” the Chinese exporter that shipped it would have to (1) fully participate in Commerce’s administrative review of the Honey Order for period during which that honey arrived; and (2) convince Commerce during that review that it did not sell the honey at a dumped price. That review would not be completed until two years or more after the honey arrived in the U.S. market.

Because Commerce has never in 12 years found that a Chinese exporter did not dump its honey shipments to the U.S. market at a steep rate, there is a very slim chance that a U.S. importer would ever recover the substantial cash deposit it would need to make to import honey from China.

It thus is not surprising that official U.S. import statistics show that very little Chinese honey has entered the U.S. market since 2008. (See the nearby chart.) What is surprising– shocking, really – is that, according to the same statistics, a whopping 310 million pounds of Chinese honey arrived in the U.S. market during the first seven years the China Honey AD Order was in place (2002-2008) – for an average of more than 44 million pounds per year. This tsunami of dumped Chinese honey arrived here despite the fact that all Chinese exporters were operating under very high duty deposit rates during this period, which should have prevented anyChinese honey from entering the U.S. market.

How could this have happened? From the time the Honey Order was issued through last year, dishonest Chinese exporters and U.S. importers perpetrated four illegal duty-evasion schemes that allowed huge volumes of Chinese honey to be shipped into the U.S. market as if that order did not exist. Two of these schemes – the "undervaluation” and "new shipper bond” schemes– were applied to Chinese honey that was presented to Customs as being pure honey from China that was covered by the Honey Order, and whose volumes were duly recorded as such in the official U.S. import statistics. These two schemes were used to import virtually all of the 310 million pounds of Chinese honey imported as such through 2008.

Under the other two evasion schemes – the "false country-of-origin” and the "honey/rice syrup” schemes – dishonest U.S. importers fraudulently reported that product to Customs as being either pure honey that was produced in a foreign country other than China; or a blend of honey and rice syrup which– while having been made in China– contained more rice syrup than honey, which put the blend beyond the coverage, or "scope,” of the China Honey AD Order.

This is the first in a series of four articles that describe how one of these four evasion schemes worked, and how that scheme was ultimately foiled by Commerce and Customs, as advised by your international trade counsel at Kelley Drye & Warren LLP. This article addresses the "undervaluation” duty evasion scheme.

We can be thankful that – except for the false country-of-origin scheme– these schemes have been defeated, and that imports arriving through the remaining scheme have been substantially reduced, though not eliminated. But two grim facts remain.

First: those four evasion schemes collectively deprived the domestic beekeepers of most of the remedial relief from dumped Chinese honey that Congress intended through the AD law for the first eleven years of the AD order’s life.

Second: dishonest Chinese exporters and their U.S. importers and other partners are devising at this moment new illegal means to bring dumped Chinese honey into the U.S. market without paying duties under the Honey Order.

Part 1: The "Undervaluation” Duty Evasion Scheme

The first AD investigation of honey imports from China, which was initiated by the government in the fall of 1994, was settled a year later through the signing by Commerce and the Government of China of a so-called "suspension agreement.” Under that agreement, the price of Chinese honey for the next five years was set at just below the average price for honey imports from countries other than China, which were dominated by Argentina honey. In addition, the agreement allowed the volume of Chinese imports to increase over the term from a relatively low initial volume.

While these terms protected domestic honey prices relatively well for the first three years, a rapid drop in price of imports from Argentina in the agreement’s fourth year allowed Chinese prices to similarly fall, and remain at low levels in the fifth year (2000), during which the very low-priced Chinese honey imports spiked to 60 million pounds. (See the nearby chart.) As a result, AHPA and Sioux Honey decided not to seek the renewal of the agreement’s five-year term in August 2000, and instead filed a new AD petition against China in late September 2000, shortly after the agreement was terminated.[3]

Commerce imposed provisional dumping duties on Chinese honey imports in May 2001, which caused those imports to fall to 40 million pounds that year. As a result of Commerce’s issuance of the Honey Order in December 2001, Chinese imports fell further in 2002 to just 18 million pounds – a 70 percent drop in just two years.

Then, officially-reported imports of Chinese honey tripled over the next four years, to an astonishing 70 million pounds in 2006. (See the nearby chart.) Virtually all of this honey was entered through two illegal duty evasion schemes: the "undervaluation” scheme, and the "new shipper bond” scheme, the first of which is the subject of this article.

The Crucial Role of AD Duty Deposit Rates

To convey the essence of the undervaluation scheme, I first must describe how Commerce and Customs determine and bill a U.S. importer for the specific amount of duty that is owed on an import that is subject to an AD order. That amount is notdetermined and billed at the time the import arrives (or is "entered” into the U.S. market). Rather, it is determined through a lengthy "duty-assessment” process that typically is not completed for two or more years after the import’s entry. Nevertheless, the U.S. importer of a product covered by an AD order must deposit with Customs at the time the product is entered a specific amount – typically in cash – as collateral against the importer’s potential failure to pay the amount of AD duty Customs eventually bills for the product.

That amount – which is referred to as an "estimated AD duty deposit,” or more simply as a "cash deposit”– is typically determined by multiplying the "duty deposit rate” of the exporter that shipped the goods by the goods’ "entered value,” which typically is the price the importer paid for the exporter for the goods, minus international shipping costs.

Duty deposit rates typically are expressed on an ad valorem basis, as a percentage. An exporter’s deposit rate will be the most recent rate of dumping that Commerce calculated for the exporter, either in the original AD investigation, or a completed administrative review of the relevant AD order. For AD orders on Chinese products, the duty deposit rate for an exporter that has not been issued its own deposit rate will be the so-called "China-wide” rate, which typically will be at least as high as the highest deposit rate that has been calculated for all exporters.

Here’s an example of this process using the Honey Order. Honey is typically traded internationally in lots of about 40,000 pounds, which is the amount typically shipped in a standard ocean-going container. So, one 40,000 pound container of Chinese honey sold by the exporter to the importer on a China port-of-export basis at $1.00/lb. would have a total entered value of $40,000.

· If the Chinese exporter that shipped the honey was operating under a 50 percentad valorem deposit rate, the U.S. importer would have to post with Customs a cash duty deposit of $20,000, or $0.50 for each pound of the imports.

· After posting the cash deposit, the importer would have a total of $60,000 (or $1.50/lb.) invested in the honey: $40,000 as the price it paid the exporter for the honey, and the $20,000 cash deposit.

· If Commerce ultimately determined that the entry had not been dumped, Customs would return to the importer the entire cash deposit, plus accrued interest. (But because Commerce has never found that Chinese honey imports from any exporter were not dumped at a steep rate, the importer had zero chance of ever getting it cash deposit back.)

· If Commerce determined that the entry had been dumped at 50 percent, Customs would take the entire cash deposit (plus accrued interest) as payment of the duties owed.

· If Commerce determined that the entry had been dumped at 100 percent, Customs would take the entire cash deposit (plus interest) as payment of half the duties owed, and it would bill the importer an additional $20,000 (plus interest) for the remainder of the duties owed.

With this background, you now have a good basis for understanding how dishonest Chinese exporters and U.S. importers used the duty evasion schemes to enter huge volumes of Chinese honey into the U.S. market as if the AD order didn’t exist.

The Undervaluation Scheme Rises from Ad Valorem Deposit Rates

As noted above, all Chinese exporters have been operating under high cash duty deposit rates since May 2001, when Commerce issued its affirmative preliminary determination of dumping in the original AD investigation. This means that substantial cash duty deposits have been required on all imports of Chinese honey since then, which should have discouraged U.S. importers from importing any of that product. Nevertheless, dishonest Chinese exporters and U.S. importers soon discovered that they could reduce these cash deposits to almost nothing by fraudulently reporting to Customs an entered value for the imports that was a fraction of the actual value. This became known as the "undervaluation” duty evasion scheme.

To demonstrate this:

· Assume the U.S. importer in the above example reported to Customs a false entered value of $5,000 (i.e., $0.125/lb.) for its 40,000 pound entry of Chinese honey, in place of the true value of $40,000.

· At the exporter’s 50 percent duty deposit rate, the cash deposit would fall from $20,000 (or $0.50/lb.) to just $2,500 (or $0.0625/lb.) – or one-eighth of the $20,000 that it should have posted.

· After posting the cash deposit, the importer would have a total of $42,500 (or $1.0625/lb.) invested in the honey: $40,000 as the price paid the exporter for the honey, and the $2,500 cash deposit.

Thus, by fraudulently "undervaluing” the entered value of its new entries of Chinese honey, this dishonest U.S. importer would be able to enter substantial volumes of Chinese honey, while shipments from other Chinese exporters would continue to be blocked by their high duty deposit rates.

The undervaluation duty evasion scheme was particularly advantageous for the dozen or so exporters that received their own duty deposit rates during the original AD investigation and the first two annual and "new shipper” administrative reviews. While each of these exporter-specific rates was substantial – ranging from 25 percent to over 100 percent – they were low enough to enable those exporters to exploit the undervaluation scheme, while the much higher China-wide deposit rate of 183 percent that applied to all other exporters kept them from exploiting the scheme – at least for the first few years.

Why did it take Commerce until early 2009 to stop the undervaluation scheme? First, it was relatively difficult for us as your trade counsel to detect the scheme was being used, and to bring the problem to Commerce’s and Customs’ attention, until some of the exporters had been using it for a year or more.

Since the Honey Order was issued, we essentially have had two imperfect tools for monitoring ongoing entries of Chinese honey: (1) official U.S. import statistics, which provide the monthly total volume, and average per-pound entered value, of all Chinese honey imports (but not for individual Chinese exporters); and (2) the so-called PIERS reports, which provide the monthly volume of U.S. arrivals of Chinese honey by exporter (but which omits shipments by exporters whose U.S. importers were smart enough to request that Customs suppress all evidence of their shipments). These tools suggested that the substantial entries of Chinese honey that had resumed in mid-2002 were being shipped by the first exporters that had requested "new shipper” administrative reviews. (The new shipper bond duty evasion scheme will be the subject of Part 2 of this four-part series of articles.)

In 2003, however, the PIERS reports started identifying substantial arrivals of Chinese honey from one exporter that should have been prevented from shipping by its significant exporter-specific duty deposit rate. At the same time, the monthly average unit values reported in the official U.S. import statistics started dropping beyond the relatively low values of the imports that had been arriving from the "new shipper” exporters. We eventually surmised that this drop was being caused by the arrival of increasing volumes of significantly undervalued Chinese honey from the exporters that had their own substantial duty deposit rates, but which were now exploiting the undervaluation scheme. This meant that substantial volumes of Chinese honey were now arriving through the undervaluation scheme, along with the huge volumes that were arriving through the new shipper bond scheme.

Commerce’s Four-Year Switch to Per-Unit Duty Deposit Rates

As 2004 unfolded, we learned from the PIERS reports that an increasing number of exporters with their own deposit rates had started exploiting the undervaluation scheme. We then presented our collected evidence of fraud to Commerce, and requested the agency to implement the only "fix” capable of stopping that scheme: changing the duty deposit rates under the China Honey AD Order from an ad valorem to a per-unit basis.

As noted above, under an ad valorem deposit rate, the cash deposit for a new entry of goods is determined by multiplying (1) the exporter’s duty deposit rate expressed as the percent by which Commerce determined the relevant exporter dumped during the most recently completed phase under the Honey Order (2) by the enteredvalue of the relevant imports. In contrast, under a per-unit deposit rate, the cash deposit is determined by multiplying (1) the exporter’s duty deposit rate expressed as the average, per-unit value by which Commerce determined the relevant exporter dumped during the most recently completed phase under the order (2) by the number of units (typically kilograms) of the goods being entered.

We believed that the switch from ad valorem to per-unit deposit rates would kill the undervaluation evasion scheme because that switch would entirely remove the imported honey’s entered value from the cash deposit calculation. During our consultations with Customs in seeking a solution to the undervaluation scheme, that agency had insisted that it is very difficult for it to detect at the time of entry whether an importer is lying about the true value of the contents of an entire container of goods such as honey. It is this fact that allowed the undervaluation scheme to flourish.

In contrast, for an importer to evade substantially all of the cash deposit determined on a per-unit basis for an entry of Chinese honey, the importer would have to falsely claim that a container designed to hold about 40,000 of just about anything, and that actually holds 40,000 pound of honey, contains only a few thousand pounds. According to Customs – and plain old common sense– it is far easier to detect volume-based fraud than value-based fraud.

Commerce agreed in 2005 that it would begin switching all of the exporter-specific duty deposit rates under the Honey Order from an ad valorem to a per-unit basis as quickly as possible. Unfortunately, it took the agency four years to complete this task. This is because Commerce determined that it could not immediately switch each exporter’s ad valorem rate to a per-unit rate, because each of the ad valoremrates had been calculated in either the original AD investigation, or one of the two annual administrative reviews and several new shipper reviews the agency had completed by then. According to Commerce, it simply did not have the authority to reopen those closed reviews to determine the equivalent per-unit deposit rates, and have those rates immediately applied on a going-forward basis.

Commerce determined that it was limited to issuing new duty deposit rates on a per-unit, instead of an ad valorem, basis for each exporter covered by the final results of 3rd administrative review under the China Honey AD Order that was then being conducted, and all such reviews initiated in the future. This was extremely disappointing news, for only a few of the many exporters that then had their own duty deposit rates were involved in ongoing 3rd administrative review, which would be completed in mid-2006. This meant that to have the duty deposit rates for the bulk of these exporters switched from an ad valorem to a per-unit basis, we would have to ask Commerce to include them in the 4th administrative review, which would not be completed until mid-2007. We knew that those exporters that were actively exploiting the undervaluation scheme would simply refuse to participate in the 4thadministrative review, which would leave them free to use the scheme until Commerce issued its final results for that review, and assigned those exporters the China-wide per unit rate.

To complicate things further, not all of exporters with their own duty deposit rates were included in the 4th administrative review, because several of these exporters, according to Customs’ records, had not shipped any Chinese honey to the U.S. market during the one-year period covered by the review ("4th POR”), which required Commerce to exclude them from that review. This indicated that there were still some exporters with their own ad valorem duty deposit rates that had not begun exploiting undervaluation scheme as of 4th POR, but which could start doing so at any time, and as a result could not be stopped until Commerce issued the final results of the future administrative review for the review period during which they finally started exploiting that scheme.

The Death of the Undervaluation Duty Evasion Scheme

Most of the exporter-specific duty deposit rates were switched from an ad valoremto a per-unit basis with the issuance of the final results of the 3rd, 4th and 5thadministrative reviews in mid-2006, -2007 and -2008, respectively. In the accelerated final results of the 6th administrative review, which were issued in December 2008, Commerce assigned the China-wide deposit rate (which was now being applied on a per-unit basis, at over $1/lb.) to the last two exporters that still had ad valorem deposit rates, and which had continued to ship substantial volumes under the undervaluation scheme.

For each exporter that was assigned a per-unit deposit rate in each of these four administrative reviews, that switch had immediately stopped all of its shipments. Indeed, officially-reported imports of Chinese honey for 2009 fell to zero, from 39 million pounds in 2007, and 24 million pounds in 2008. (See the nearby chart.)

It is impossible to determine exactly how much of the 310 million pounds in officially-reported Chinese honey imports that entered between 2002 and 2008 arrived through each of undervaluation and new shipper bond duty evasion schemes. (Seethe nearby chart.) Because the new the new shipper bond scheme ended in August 2006, when Congress suspended the so-called new shipper bonding option, the 63 million pounds of Chinese honey that was imported in 2007 and 2008 must have arrived entirely through the undervaluation scheme. If half of the 247 million pounds of imports that arrived between 2002 and 2006 was shipped through the undervaluation scheme, 188 million pounds of imports would have entered through that scheme through 2008.

There is no doubt that all of that honey was sold here at steeply dumped prices, which economically injured the domestic honey producers by significantly depressing the overall price of honey in the U.S. market – precisely the type of injury the AD law was intended to prevent.

But the undervaluation scheme also deprived the AHPA and Sioux Honey members of tens of millions of dollars they would have collected under the so-called Byrd Amendment to the AD law, which applies to all imports that were made through that scheme through 2007. Commerce eventually determined that all of these imports had been dumped at the China-wide rate of $1.19/lb. Had those imports been secured by the full cash deposits the U.S. importers were required by the AD law to post with Customs at the time of entry, all of those deposits would have been entirely forfeited to Customs in partial payment of the AD duties that agency ultimately assessed on the imports. Of course, Customs would have been required to distribute all of those funds under the Byrd Amendment to the domestic honey producers. As it turned out, the duty collections on those imports consisted of just the fractional cash deposits the importers posted actually with Customs.

* * *

Next time: Mr. Coursey will review in Part 2 of this series the "new shipper bond” duty evasion scheme.


[1] Mr. Coursey is a partner in the International Trade and Customs Law Practice Group of Kelley Drye & Warren, LLP. With his colleagues at Kelley Drye, Mr. Coursey has had the honor of advising and representing the AHPA on international trade issues for 20 years.

[2] In addition, the China Honey AD Order has been twice retained for additional five-year periods beyond the normal five-year life of AD orders through two "sunset” administrative reviews, in 2007 and 2012. In those reviews, Commerce and the ITC ruled that if the order were terminated, substantial volumes of dumped Chinese honey would again flow into the U.S. market, and would again materially injury the domestic beekeepers.

[3] The associations also filed an AD petition, and a countervailing duty (or "anti-subsidy”) petition, against the huge volume of similarly low-priced honey imports from Argentina. Commerce issued AD and CVD orders against honey from Argentina at the same time it issued the AD order against Chinese honey. Virtually no duty evasion schemes were perpetrated under the orders on honey from Argentina, which successfully protected the domestic honey industry from through 2012, when they were terminated as a result of AHPA’s and Sioux Honey’s decision not to ask Commerce and the ITC to extend the orders for another five years.

MEXICO- QUINTANA ROO BEEKEEPERS AFFECTED BY THE LACK OF RAINS

Apinews - 16. august 2014 - 16:51
MEXICO- QUINTANA ROO BEEKEEPERS AFFECTED BY THE LACK OF RAINS

About three thousand producers of  four municipalities of the state, are affected by the lack of rain because the bees do not have food to produce honey, so about 70 thousand hives are at serious risk of losing their production due to lack of pollen.

CHILE - ANALYZES THE APICULTURAL SECTOR THE NEW BEEKEEPING BILL

Apinews - 16. august 2014 - 16:48
CHILE - ANALYZES THE APICULTURAL SECTOR THE NEW BEEKEEPING BILL

Beekeepers, as confirmed by the national leader Misael Cuevas and provincial leader Oscar Padilla, analyzed the bill presented by Senator Juan Pablo Letelier, who seeks to end legislative activity precarious that develops and makes the production of the hive to height of livestock, with the benefits and challenges that affect other livestock categories, such as red and white meats.

ARGENTINA- NOT TOO MANY PEOPLE ASSISTED TO A BEEKEEPÌNG DAY IN BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE

Apinews - 16. august 2014 - 16:44
ARGENTINA- NOT TOO MANY PEOPLE ASSISTED TO A BEEKEEPÌNG DAY IN BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE

Technicians of the Beekeeping Coordination Unit of the Ministry of Land Affairs in the province of Buenos Aires issued in the city of Las Flores, a training on bee health  to producers of  the region.

 

ARGENTINA- APPROVED A LAW ABOUT THE USES OF THE LA PAMPA PROVINCE BEEKEEPING PARK

Apinews - 16. august 2014 - 16:37
ARGENTINA- APPROVED A LAW ABOUT THE USES OF THE LA PAMPA PROVINCE BEEKEEPING PARK

Approved a law to extend the beekeeping park, now on is also including agri food industries

ARGENTINA- BY THE CRISIS MENDOZA PROVINCE BEEKEEPERS REQUEST TO THE GOVERNMENT ACTIONS, WITH LITTLE SUCCESS

Apinews - 16. august 2014 - 16:32
ARGENTINA- BY THE CRISIS MENDOZA PROVINCE BEEKEEPERS REQUEST TO THE GOVERNMENT ACTIONS,  WITH LITTLE SUCCESS

"No bloom, can not make honey. Losses in the sector have been important," said the president of the Beekeepers Association of Southern APISUR, Pedro Lioy, adding that "we are asking the authorities to declare the" bee emergency. "" After the poor harvest this season we have to feed the bees with sugar syrup and pollen products , all them are  very expensive, "said the producer

CHILE- MORE ABOUT THE VII BEEKEEPING SIMPOSIUM

Apinews - 16. august 2014 - 16:26
CHILE- MORE ABOUT THE VII BEEKEEPING SIMPOSIUM

Interview to  Prof Ramón Rebolledo, Doctor Nimia Manquian and Lic. Antonio Gomez  Pajuelo

 

 

 

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SAUDI ARABIA- THE COUNTRY IS THE BIGGEST HONEY PRODUCER IN THE AREA

Apinews - 15. august 2014 - 18:53
SAUDI  ARABIA- THE COUNTRY IS THE BIGGEST HONEY PRODUCER IN THE AREA

The Kingdom is the leading producer of honey in the Arab World, producing over 9,000 tons annually and is home to 5,000 beekeepers and 1 million bee nests

SCOTLAND - THE PARLIAMENT ANALYZED THE POLLINATORS PROBLEM

Apinews - 15. august 2014 - 18:44
SCOTLAND - THE PARLIAMENT ANALYZED THE  POLLINATORS  PROBLEM

Meeting of the Parliament on August 14, 2014. Please download attached document

ARGENTINA- PRESENTED THE PROGRAM OF THE HONEY EXPO LAVALLE 2014

Apinews - 15. august 2014 - 18:39
ARGENTINA- PRESENTED THE PROGRAM OF THE HONEY EXPO LAVALLE 2014

In the city of Lavalle, Mendoza province from September 19 to 21, 2014

 

 

 

USA- CALL TO SEND A REQUEST TO YOUR SENATOR/REPRESENTATIVE TO PROTECT THE HONEY AND POLLINATION SUPPLY

Apinews - 15. august 2014 - 17:12
USA- CALL TO SEND A REQUEST TO YOUR SENATOR/REPRESENTATIVE TO PROTECT THE HONEY AND POLLINATION SUPPLY

The United States Dept. of Agriculture (USDA) monitors the nation's honey supply.  This sweet by-product of pollinating our food and other bee attractive plants generated nearly $120 million in honey sales.  However, honey production has been decreasing over the last thirteen years from 80.2 Million pounds of honey in 2000 to 56.6 million pounds in 2013.  The loss of honey bees due to pesticides, pests, pathogens, and poor forage is taking its toll on honey bees and beekeepers. Join us in urging Congress to protect the American honey supply.  If you are a beekeeper, tell your Senator and Representative.  If you support beekeeping, understand the value of pollinators to our food supply and greater ecosystem tell your Senator and Representative.  We need you to speak for honey bees.  Your Senator and Representative need to know you value honey bees and American honey.  Honey bees must be supported in order to be abundant and healthy in order to make honey for the American consumer.

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